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THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTRAGROUP
RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY: A CRITICAL REVIEW
LOURDES PERONI
The story of religion is, in substantial part, the story of adaptation and response to changing social worlds and, for centuries, the law has been one
important figure in this dynamic history. Law has not just struggled with
questions of religious freedom but has challenged religion to test the resiliency, complexity, and resources of its own traditions. An important
challenge for contemporary human rights law is to ensure that it continues to encourage this dynamism rather than serving as a freezing agent.
— Benjamin L. Berger1

INTRODUCTION
This Article examines ways in which one of the most established human rights courts—the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court” or
“the Strasbourg Court”)—encourages or discourages intragroup religious
diversity and dissent.2 The Strasbourg Court is thought to be one of the
most robust systems of human rights protection in the world.3 Its voice is
arguably one of the most influential human rights voices in the growing

Ph.D. Researcher, Faculty of Law of Ghent University, Belgium. I am grateful to Holning Lau and
Saila Ouald Chaib for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this Article. The research for this
work was conducted within the framework of the European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant
project entitled “Strengthening the European Court of Human Rights: More Accountability through
Better Legal Reasoning.”
1. Benjamin L. Berger, Inducing Fundamentalisms: Law as a Cultural Force in the Domain of
Religion, 9 CANADIAN DIVERSITY 25, 28 (2012).
2. Set up in 1959, the Strasbourg Court rules on alleged violations of the European Convention
on Human Rights (“ECHR”) in a jurisdiction made up of eight hundred million people living in the
forty-seven Council of Europe Member States that have ratified the ECHR. See EUR. CT. H.R. THE
COURT IN BRIEF, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Court_in_brief_ENG.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Paul Johnson, An Essentially Private Manifestation of Human Personality: Constructions of Homosexuality in the European Court of Human Rights, 10 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67, 74
(2010) (arguing that “the Court must be regarded as one of the most important discoursing machines in
the world”); Anna Grear, Challenging Corporate “Humanity”: Legal Disembodiment, Embodiment and
Human Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 511, 536 (2007) (arguing that the Court is “widely thought to be
the most juridically mature of human rights regimes”); Peter G. Danchin & Lisa Forman, The Evolving
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Protection of Religious Minorities, in
PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE 192 (Peter G
Danchin & Elizabeth A. Cole eds. 2002) (arguing that the Court “has established itself as the most
effective regional system for the protection of human rights in the world.”).
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“transjudicial communication,”4 as wide reference to its precedents across
the world attest.5
Yet when it comes to the protection of one of the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
freedom of religion, the Court’s track record is at best mixed.6 In fact, it
took more than three decades for the Court to find the first freedom of religion violation in 1993.7 During those decades, it looked like the ECHR
provision guaranteeing freedom of religion (Article 98) “was going to be
effectively a dead letter.”9 Today, twenty years since the first Article 9
violation, the Court’s increasing freedom of religion jurisprudence “has not
translated into greater protection for religious individuals in many instances.”10

4. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L. REV.
99, 101 (1994-1995) (referring to the phenomenon of transjudicial communication as “communication
among courts––whether national or supranational––across borders.”).
5. Both domestic and supranational courts refer to the European Court of Human Rights precedents. See, e.g., Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], octubre 15, 1997, Sentencia T523/97 (Colom.) (citing Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978)); U.S. Supreme
Court, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (citing Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) (1981)) and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, González et al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009)
(citing Angelova and Iliev v. Bulgaria, App. No. 55523/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007), available at
http://echr.ketse.com/doc/55523.00-en-20070726/view/ (unpublished Court (Fifth Section) decision)).
6. The Court has been criticized for offering inadequate protection to the individual exercise of
freedom of religion. See, e.g., Javier Martínez-Torrón, The (Un)Protection of Individual Religious
Identity in the Strasbourg Case Law, 1 OXFORD J. OF LAW AND RELIGION 1, 1 (2012) (arguing that the
Court has not adequately protected individual religious identity expressed in ordinary life).
7. The Court found the first violation of Article 9 of the ECHR in Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260-A
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
8. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 9, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. Freedom to
manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
9. Carolyn Evans, Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human
Rights: Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture, 26 J.L. & RELIGION 321, 321 (2010-2011).
10. Id. In fact, the number of violations of freedom of religion violations remains strikingly small
when compared with the amount of violations found under other rights guaranteed by the ECHR. The
Court’s most recent table of violations reveals that, in the period of 1959-2012, the Court has found
only forty six violations of freedom of religion. In the same period of time, the Court has found nine
hundred and forty violations of the right to respect for private and family life; five hundred and twelve
violations of freedom of expression; and a hundred and forty one violations of freedom of association
and assembly. See EUR. CT H.R., VIOLATIONS BY ARTICLE AND BY RESPONDENT STATE (1959-2012),
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_1959_2012_ENG.pdf.
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By all accounts, assumptions about religion underlying the Court’s
understanding of the scope and content of freedom of religion11 may partly
explain such an unfortunate state of affairs.12 To be sure, the ECHR, like
many other human rights instruments, does not define religion.13 Moreover,
the Court has not attempted a formal and comprehensive definition. Yet, at
times, implicit assumptions about religion as a set of “theological propositions”14 to which people adhere and assumptions of orthodoxy about certain religious groups15 surface in the Court’s freedom of religion reasoning.
In this Article I argue that, in sidelining religious practices that do not
conform to religious orthodoxy, these sorts of assumptions may obscure
and discourage diversity within religious groups. Incorporating insights
from religious studies, I thus propose that the Court becomes more critically aware of these background assumptions about religion and about certain
religious groups when assessing religious freedom claims. In particular, I
suggest that the Court eschew assumptions of orthodoxy about religious
groups when these assumptions fix and naturalize certain religious practices as the defining ones for the entire group.
My discussion proceeds as follows: I start by outlining one of the
main ways in which the legal assessment of freedom of religion is usually
framed and by formulating my inquiry differently, in light of insights from
religion scholars. With these insights in mind, I then examine the Court’s
freedom of religion case law, identify the underlying assumptions about
religion and about certain religious groups, and unpack the consequences
that their workings carry for the protection of applicants’ religious practices
and the internal diversity in their religious groups. I show that, at times, the
Court looks at these cases through lenses that make more space for lived
11. See Peter G. Danchin, Islam in the Secular Nomos of the European Court of Human Rights, 32
MICH. J. INT’L L. 663, 676 (2011) (arguing that “any attempt to define the scope and content of the right
to religious liberty will necessarily involve assumptions about the underlying nature of religion itself.”).
12. See Carolyn Evans, Religious Freedom in European Human Rights Law: The Search for a
Guiding Conception, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 385, 396 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn
Evans eds., 1999) (arguing that the Court tends to privilege “the cerebral, the internal and the theological over the active, the symbolic and the moral dimensions of religion and belief” and showing how this
notion of religion may pose difficulties for religious groups that play greater emphasis on retaining a
“distinctive lifestyle.”). See also Lourdes Peroni, Deconstructing “Legal” Religion in Strasbourg, 2
OXFORD J. OF LAW AND RELIGION 1, 14 (2013). In this Article, I similarly challenge the Court’s implicit construction of religion as primarily a matter of internal belief and conscience given the exclusionary
and inegalitarian implications it carries for the protection of the religious freedom of people who conceive of religion as practice.
13. See T. Jeremy Gunn, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of ‘‘Religion’’ in International Law, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 189, 189-190 (2003).
14. Evans, supra note 12, at 395.
15. I borrow the notion of “assumption of orthodoxy” about certain religious groups from Lori G.
Beaman. Lori G. Beaman, The Missing Link: Tolerance, Accommodation and. . . Equality, 9 CANADIAN
DIVERSITY 16, 19 (2012); see also discussion infra Part II.A.2.
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experiences of religion and internal group diversity, and at others, through
lenses that hardly leave any room for such diversity. I conclude by sketching out some premises on which the Court should ground its analysis to
more fully embrace the former and eschew the latter.
I. THE LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: FRAMING THE ISSUES
Part of the debates surrounding the assessment of religious freedom
has been traditionally couched in terms of objective and subjective approaches.16 Broadly put, an objective approach involves determining
whether a certain act “counts” as religious practice for the purposes of legal
protection by reference to the tenets recognized as mandatory in a particular religion (by e.g., the authoritative bodies or other members of the community).17 A subjective approach, on the other hand, relies “not on what
others view the claimant’s religious obligations as being, but rather [on]
what the claimant views these personal religious ‘obligations’ to be.”18
Kent Greenawalt insightfully identifies the two variables usually involved
in the process:
One concerns perspective; is that of the individual or the group to count?
The other variable concerns stringency; must the behavior in which the
claimant wants to engage. . .be required from a religious point of view,
be a central religious practice or closely related to a central religious belief, or be merely connected more weakly to religious belief or practice?”19

Either way, scholars of religion have made clear that the two tests rest
on different understandings of religion. The objective test understands religion as, “doctrinally definite and authoritatively determined by an institutional church. Being religious—exercising religion—is being obedient to
the legal prescriptions of that religion.”20 The subjective view, on the other
16. For a discussion of the subjective and objective approaches in the U.S. context, see, e.g.,
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Judging Religion, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 441 (1998); Kent Greenawalt, Judicial
Resolution of Issues about Religious Conviction, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 461 (1998). In the Canadian context, see e.g., Richard Moon, Religious Commitment and Identity: Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, 29
SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW 201 (2005); Robert E. Charney, How Can There Be Any Sin in Sincere?
State Inquiries into Sincerity of Religious Belief, 51 SUP. CT. REV. 47 (2010); Solange Lefebvre, Religion in Court, Between an Objective and a Subjective Definition, in REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION:
MANAGING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY 32 (Lori G. Beaman ed., 2012). In the ECHR context, see e.g.,
CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
111-127 (2001).
17. See, e.g., Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 551 (Can.) at ¶ 43.
18. Id. at ¶ 54.
19. Greenawalt, supra note 16, at 465 (identifying and unpacking the variables involved in the
process of determining whether a claimant’s religion is “substantially burdened” in the U.S. context)
(emphasis added).
20. Sullivan, supra note 16, at 446.
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hand, imagines religion as “personally determined—a matter of individual
choice.”21 Both tests have raised objections.22 One critique usually made
against the objective test is that it tends to be oblivious to the difficulties of
determining religious orthodoxy.23 Another objection is that the objective
approach tends to “essentialize and simplify the complicated and complex
relationships between believer, belief and practice.”24 Moreover, “in falling
back on the majority opinion in a religious community,” this kind of approach may contribute to “the marginalization of minority voices.”25 In
turn, a common concern raised about the subjective test is its Protestant
bias given its focus on the individual.26 In many religious traditions, as
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan explains, the focus is not individual belief:
“[T]he needs and identity of the community . . . take[s] precedence and
religious practice . . . play[s] a bigger role.”27
In fact, it seems that delving into elements of religious dogma or doctrine cannot be wholly avoided in freedom of religion assessments. Even
the most subjective tests—like the sincerity-of-belief test applied by some
courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada28—appear to have “unspoken” parts that ultimately involve an assessment of religious doctrine.29 As
21. Id.
22. For a brief analysis of the difficulties raised by each of these approaches, see GÉRARD
BOUCHARD & CHARLES TAYLOR Report BUILDING THE FUTURE: A TIME FOR RECONCILIATION 175177 (2008). See also Emmanuelle, Bribosia, Julie Ringelheim, and Isabelle Rorive, Reasonable Accommodation for Religious Minorities: A Promising Concept for European Antidiscrimination Law? 17
MAASTRICHT JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN AND COMPARATIVE LAW 137, 149 (2010).
23. Sullivan, supra note 16, at 448.
24. Lori G. Beaman, Defining Religion: The Promise and the Peril of Legal Interpretation, in
LAW AND RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN CANADA 192, 201 (Richard Moon ed., 2008).
25. BOUCHARD & TAYLOR, supra note 22, at 176.
26. Sullivan, supra note 16, at 449. The idea that it is “the individual who decides” is “a basically
Protestant understanding of authority.” WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 133 (2005).
27. Sullivan, supra note 16, at 449. For critical assessments of courts’ privileging of the individual
aspect at the expense of the collective or communal dimension, see, e.g., Benjamin Berger, Law’s
Religion: Rendering Culture, 45 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL 277, 288 (2007) (highlighting Canadian courts’ emphasis on the individual and their treatment of collective traditions and institutions as
“only of derivative importance” when determining what counts as religious) and AVIGAIL EISENBERG,
REASONS OF IDENTITY: A NORMATIVE GUIDE TO THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASSESSMENT OF
IDENTITY CLAIMS 107-108 (2009) (arguing that privileging individual subjective views ignores “the
communal function” of religious practices).
28. A well-known example epitomizing this approach is the case of Syndicat Northcrest v. Amselem , [2004] 2 SCR 551 (Can.), decided by the Supreme Court of Canada.
29. Lori G. Beaman, Conclusion, in REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION: MANAGING RELIGIOUS
DIVERSITY 208, 217 (Lori G. Beaman ed., 2012). See also, Lefebvre, supra note 16, at 47; EISENBERG,
supra note 27, at 108. In an analysis of several cases decided by the Supreme Court of Canada,
Lefebvre points to the contradiction, between “the affirmation of the secondary character of dogma,
doctrine and orthodoxy and the persistent reference to these aspects as criteria to judge the sincerity or
the noneccentric nature of belief.” Lefebvre, supra note 16, at 47. In a similar vein, Avigail Eisenberg
contends: “Even in a case like Amselem, the Canadian court relies far more heavily on assumptions and
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Lori Beaman puts it, the question is ultimately “sincerely held belief in
what?”30 “One must sincerely believe in something.”31 “To determine sincerity,” she argues, “someone (the court, an expert, the believer) must identify a set of beliefs and practices.”32 For Beaman, and others, it is therefore
simply impossible to separate sincerity from content.33 Avigail Eisenberg,
for instance, contends that “it is nearly impossible for courts to avoid assessing the tenets of religious faith or to base their decisions entirely on
individual sincerity, despite their eagerness to avoid scrutiny of religious
doctrine and traditions.”34 Eisenberg believes that this impossibility is due
to the collective dimension often involved in religious identity claims.35 In
reality, sometimes cases cannot be decided from a mere individual perspective; they crucially require an analysis of the group’s perspective.36
The starting point of this Article is therefore that, for the purposes of
my inquiry, it is more fruitful to focus on the scope, variety and role of
objective elements (e.g., requirements or precepts established in texts or by
religious authorities, views/practices of other members of the community).
I thus attempt to assess the space the Strasbourg Court makes for religious
diversity and dissent within religious groups in a less dichotomous manner.
The degree of receptiveness to applicants’ varied religious experiences—
and, therefore, to intragroup variation and dissent—may be more effectively assessed by focusing on the ways in which the Court deploys objective
elements. In other words, the issue is not so much whether the Court applies one or the other approach (subjective or objective) in a black-andwhite fashion. The issue is rather whether, in employing objective elements
in its legal analysis, the Court emphasizes (and encourages) or obscures
(and discourages) complexity and diversity within religious groups.
To this end, I borrow the notions of “relatively porous” and “relatively
dense” lenses developed by Barbara Flagg.37 In an assessment of doctrinal
appeals to subjectivity as a strategy for pursuing pluralism in the U.S. legal

assessments about religious dogma than would be necessary if sincerity is the real basis.” EISENBERG,
supra note 27, at 108.
30. Beaman, supra note 29, at 217.
31. Beaman, supra note 24, at 201 (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 209.
34. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 27, at 108
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 16, at 467 (giving as an example the case of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (concerning the building of a road
that would affect sacred sites of Native Americans)).
37. Barbara J. Flagg, The Algebra of Pluralism: Subjective Experience as a Constitutional Variable, 47 VAND. L. REV. 273, 331 (1994).
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context, Flagg shows that “the lived experience of real people is always
filtered through one objective lens or another.”38 The strategy, she claims,
is “fraught with peril, from a pluralist perspective” because, in fact, there is
no open articulation of the objective criteria employed to determine what
subjective experiences “count.”39 In an effort to mitigate the anti-pluralist
risk of this approach, Flagg develops the idea of “a continuum of objective
filters” overlaying on subjective experiences.40 These filters range from,
“relatively porous objective standards that operate to validate most, if not
all, actual subjective experiences, to relatively dense requirements that
function to exclude from further doctrinal consideration some significant
portion of the actual range of lived experiences.”41 Pluralism, she claims,
“is served when subjective experience is viewed through a relatively porous objective filter, and it is disserved when the objective lens is relatively
dense.”42
In this Article, I share Flagg’s concern with how objective criteria applied by courts to claimants’ lived experiences may make more or less
space for pluralism (in my case, intragroup religious pluralism). Thus, I
find her notions of relatively dense and relatively porous objective lenses
and their role in serving or disserving pluralism apt for present purposes. In
the remainder of this Article, I therefore look at the room the Strasbourg
Court leaves for intragroup religious diversity through the types of lenses
identified by Flagg. I believe that a frame focused on the features of the
objective lenses employed in the analysis of religious claims rather than on
the more dichotomous subjective/objective approaches (e.g., individual/collective, individual/institutional, practice/theology) might better capture the nuance and complexity that the latter frame tends to miss.
II. LOOKING AT INTRAGROUP DIVERSITY IN STRASBOURG THROUGH
OBJECTIVE RELIGIOUS LENSES
A look at the complaints filed with the Strasbourg Court reveals that
applicants’ religious practices exhibit different degrees of conformity, if
any, to religious dogma. Indeed, some applicants follow religiously prescribed practices strictly. Other claimants engage in practices that are not
prescribed or widely recognized. Yet others fully embrace orthodox norms
and practices. The large majority of applicants comes to the Court as part
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 318.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 331.
Id.
Id.
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of collectives. They present themselves as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Coptic
Christians, Buddhists, Muslims, and Sikhs—to name just a few—bringing
to the Court’s analysis an inescapable collective dimension. At times, they
openly rely on the doctrines or views of institutional bodies or members of
their religious groups in support of their claims. Some even portray their
practices as the “core” of their group’s religious identity. Other times, applicants admit that their practices may not be required by or central to their
religion but still claim that they express their deep commitment to it.
One way of assessing the Court’s responsiveness to such a variety of
religious experiences within religious groups is by focusing on how the
Court employs objective filters in determining whether such experiences
fall within the scope of freedom of religion. Article 9 of the ECHR guarantees, among other things, the freedom to manifest one’s religion in teaching, observance, practice and worship.43 One of the preliminary questions
the Strasbourg Court asks when examining a religious freedom case is
whether a certain act counts as a “manifestation” of the applicant’s religion
within the meaning of this provision. The purpose of this inquiry is to determine whether the act in question attracts the protection of Article 9 of
the ECHR.44
Traditionally, the criteria employed by the Court (and by the now extinct European Commission of Human Rights) to recognize “manifestations” of religion in practice “have swung from ‘normal and recognized
manifestations’ of the religion or belief to manifestations required by the
religion or belief without any strong consistency.”45 In reality—and even
though it has long been unclear whether the action in question needed to be
“required” by the religion or simply strongly connected to it46—this ap43. Article 9(1) of the ECHR states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,
practice and observance.” (emphasis added).
44. Another crucial stage in the Court’s freedom of religion analysis is the one conducted under
Article 9(2) of the ECHR. Article 9(2) of the ECHR provides the grounds on which freedom to manifest
one’s religion may be restricted by stating: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.” So if a claim passes all the preliminary hurdles – including the qualification as a “manifestation” of religion – the Court proceeds to examine whether the interference with
religious freedom is justified as “necessary in a democratic society.” The Court here checks whether the
interference pursues a legitimate aim and, if so, whether the interference is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. For a detailed analysis of the stages the Strasbourg Court follows in its Article 9
analysis, see MALCOLM D. EVANS, MANUAL ON THE WEARING OF RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS IN PUBLIC
AREAS 7-20 (2009).
45. Isabelle Rorive, Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a European Answer, 30
CARDOZO L. REV. 2669, 2674 (2009) (footnote omitted).
46. EVANS, supra note 16, at 202.
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proach has resulted in a distinction between “proper” manifestations of a
religion and those acts simply inspired, motivated or influenced by it.47
In recent years, however, the Court has gradually started to “count”
practices that, though not necessarily required by a religion, are still motivated or inspired by it.48 In this way, albeit not consistently, the Strasbourg
Court has shown itself more sensitive to forms of religion that may not
necessarily be institutionally or textually required.49
In what follows, I identify some of the main features characterizing
the objective filters employed by the Court in determining what “counts” as
“manifestations” of religion for the purposes of Article 9 ECHR. Moreover,
I assess the implications that the application of these filters may have for
hindering or furthering religious intragroup diversity.
A. Relatively Dense Objective Filters
In this part, I look at two groups of cases. In the first group, the Court
refuses to count applicants’ practices as a “manifestation” of religion because they fail to show that such practices are required by it. In the second
set of cases, the Court counts the applicants’ practices as a “manifestation”
of their religion largely based on essentialist understandings of group identity.

47. The Court has long been criticized for minimizing the scope of Article 9(1) of the ECHR by
adopting a restrictive approach to determining what counts as a manifestation of religion or belief. See,
e.g., Malcolm D. Evans, Freedom of Religion and the European Convention on Human Rights: Approaches, Trends and Tensions, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THEORETICAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT
291, 295 (Peter Cane, Carolyn Evans and Zoe Robinson eds., 2008); EVANS, supra note 16, at 394;
LUCY VICKERS, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION AND THE WORKPLACE 96-100
(2008).
48. See, e.g., Gatis Kovalkovs v. Latvia, App. No. 35021/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., at ¶ 60 (2012),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-10909931 (unpublished Court
(Third Section) decision); Jakobski v. Poland, App. No. 18429/06, ¶ 45, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005-VI, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102121; Leyla Sahin v. Turkey [GC],
App. No. 44774/98, ¶ 78, Eur. Ct. H.R. 2005-XI, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pa
ges/search.aspx?i=001-70956. However, in Kosteski v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
App. No. 55170/00, ¶ 38, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sit
es/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-73342 (unpublished Court (Third Section) decision) the Court does not
count taking time off work to celebrate a religious holiday as a “manifestation” of the applicant’s
Islamic faith but accepts that it was motivated by it. See EVANS, supra note 44, at 295.
49. The distinction between religious manifestation and religiously motivated conduct remains
however in place in the Court’s jurisprudence. The Court has recently re-affirmed that not every act “in
some way inspired, motivated or influenced by it constitutes a ‘manifestation’ of the belief.” Eweida
and Others v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 48420/10, ¶ 58, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881.
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1. Requiring Conformity with Orthodoxy
In a number of cases, the Court (and the former Commission) has implicitly or explicitly required conformity with religious mandates or prescriptions in order for practices to count as “manifestations” of religion for
the purposes of Article 9 of the ECHR. In making the protection of applicants’ freedom of religion conditional upon conformity with authoritatively
(e.g., institutionally or textually) mandated beliefs or practices, this filter
remains relatively closed to what religious scholars call “lived religion.”
Lived religion, as Meredith McGuire notes, distinguishes “the actual experience of religious persons from the prescribed religion of institutionally
defined beliefs and practices.”50 It is the kind of religion that flows into
“everyday activities and objects” and that is “spectacularly resistant to hierarchical control.”51 Robert Orsi describes lived religion in the following
terms:
Lived religion cannot be separated from other practices of everyday life,
from the ways that humans do other necessary and important things, or
from other cultural structures and discourses . . . Nor can sacred spaces
be understood in isolation from the places where these things are done—
workplaces, hospitals, law courts, homes, and streets.52

Several cases in the Strasbourg case law illustrate the relative density
of this type of objective filter and its incapacity to attend to lived religious
experiences and diversity within religious groups. One example is X. v. the
United Kingdom (1981), a case brought by a Muslim school teacher complaining that he was forced to resign from his job for not being allowed to
take time off on Fridays to attend prayers at a nearby mosque.53 One of the
main disputes between the parties was whether this attendance was “required by Islam and thus a ‘necessary part’ of his religious practice.”54 The
Commission found that the applicant did not convincingly show that “he
was required by Islam” to disregard his contractual duties and to go to the

50. MEREDITH B. MCGUIRE, LIVED RELIGION: FAITH AND PRACTICE IN EVERYDAY LIFE 12
(2008). McGuire adds: “Although lived religion pertains to the individual, it is not merely subjective.
Rather, people construct their religious worlds together, often sharing vivid experiences of that intersubjective reality.” Id. On lived religion, see generally, DAVID D. HALL, LIVED RELIGION IN AMERICA:
TOWARD A HISTORY OF PRACTICE (1997).
51. SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 140.
52. Robert A. Orsi, Is the Study of Lived Religion Irrelevant to the World We Live In?, 42 J. SCI.
STUDY OF RELIGION 169, 172 (2003).
53. X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8160/78, 22 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 27 (1981),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-74929.
54. Id. at 34.
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mosque during school time.55 It added, however, that, even if such religious
obligation were assumed, the case was anyhow inadmissible on other
grounds.56 In another case, X. v. the United Kingdom (1974), the Commission similarly found that the applicant, a Buddhist prisoner, showed that
communication with other Buddhists was an important part of his religious
practice but “failed to prove that it was a necessary part of this practice
that he should publish articles in a religious magazine.”57 The applicant’s
complaint that he was not allowed to send out articles for publication in a
Buddhist magazine was therefore found manifestly ill-founded.
Another, newer, case in point is Jones v. the United Kingdom
(2005).58 The case was brought by a father banned from placing a memorial stone with a photograph on the grave of his daughter. His complaint was
that the bar on photographs interfered with his religion, as the Church of
Wales accepts photographs on graves. His practice, however, did not count
as a “manifestation” of his religious beliefs in the sense protected by Article 9 of the ECHR. After pointing out that it was “irrelevant for this purpose that the church of which the applicant is a member permitted such
photographs,” the Court held: “[I]t cannot be argued that the applicant’s
belief required a photograph on the memorial or that he could not properly
pursue his religion and worship without permission for such a photograph
being given.”59 In the first part of this reasoning, the Court dismisses the
relevance of institutional permission; it considers irrelevant that the Church
of Wales permits photographs. In the next part, the Court appears to emphasize the relevance of institutional requirement; it suggests that, since
placing such a photograph on the memorial is not a requirement of the applicant’s religion, the act does not fall under Article 9 protection. The suggestion seems to be that the photograph has nothing do with the applicant’s
religion: he can perfectly practice his religion without it. The complaint
was quickly dismissed as incompatible ratione materiae with the ECHR

55. Id. at 35 (emphasis added). The kind of test requiring applicants “to show that they [are]
required to act in a certain way because of their religion or belief” has come to be known as the Arrowsmith test. EVANS, supra note 16, at 115. The test “was intended to introduce an element of objectivity into the determination of whether an action is a ‘practice’ for the purposes of Article 9(1).” Id. at
203. For an analysis and critique of this test, see id. at 111-127.
56. X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8160/78, 22 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep., at 27, 35.
57. X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5442/72, 1 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 41, 42 (1974),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-74994 (emphasis added).
58. Jones v. United Kingdom (dec.), App. No. 42639/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-70437 (unpublished Court (Fourth Section)
decision).
59. Id. at ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
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provisions,60 even when many scholars of religion would agree that practices surrounding individuals’ death or that of their loved ones “are close to
the heart of religion.”61 Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, for example, emphasizes the importance that “practices associated with a burial site” can have for
religious people.62 These practices may include “placing of material objects
symbolic of the dead person’s life.”63
Another kind of relatively dense filter can be found in D. v. France
(1983).64 The case concerned a Jewish applicant who, in refusing to deliver
the divorce document (“get”) to his ex-wife, was found in disagreement
with the tenets of his religion. The Commission first noted that the applicant did not allege that, in delivering the get, he would be acting against his
religious convictions but that he would be forfeiting the possibility of remarrying his ex-wife.65 Next, the Commission found that the applicant’s
refusal was “at variance on this point with the religious leaders.”66 In this
respect, it observed that it appeared from a domestic court’s judgment that
“under Hebrew law it is customary to hand over the letter of repudiation
after the civil divorce has been pronounced, and that no man with genuine
religious convictions would contemplate delaying the remittance of this
letter to his ex-wife.”67 Based on these reasons, the Commission concluded
that the applicant’s refusal did not count as a manifestation of his religion
and declared his complaint manifestly ill-founded. While the first point
made by the Commission seems sensible (the fact that the applicant’s refusal to deliver the get was not actually based on his religious convictions),
the second point appears problematic (the fact that the applicant was at
variance with religious leaders). Indeed, the second approach is problematic because, in implicitly requiring agreement with the opinion of religious
leaders in order to attract Article 9 protection, the Court risks marginalizing
minority or dissenting voices within religious groups.
The rationale underlying the Court’s reasoning in D. v. France is
somehow different from the one underpinning the reasoning in the three
60. The subject matter of the claim did not come within the scope of the ECHR and was therefore
rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the ECHR.
61. SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 215. See also my analysis of the Jones case along similar lines in
Lourdes Peroni, Deconstructing “Legal” Religion in Strasbourg, in 2 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LAW AND
RELIGION 1, 14 (2013).
62. SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 217.
63. Id. at 216.
64. D. v. France, App. No. 10180/82, 35 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 199 (1983), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-74175.
65. Id. at 202.
66. Id.
67. Id. As Carolyn Evans notes, this conclusion is taken from a domestic court’s decision rather
than from expert evidence offered to the Commission. EVANS, supra note 16, at 121 n.108.
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other cases discussed earlier. In the three previous cases, Article 9 of the
ECHR did not protect the applicants because they sought to engage in practices seemingly not required by their religions. In D. v. France, on the other hand, Article 9 of the ECHR did not protect the applicant, in part,
because he wanted to engage in an act viewed as contrary to the requirements of his religion.
The approach adopted by the Court (and the Commission) in cases
such as the ones examined above has been criticized for disadvantaging
religious people who do not accept all doctrinal prescriptions of a particular
religion or who believe that their religion places further demands on
them.68 Moreover, this approach does not take into account that some religions “may specify a group of mandatory practices;” others, however, may
encourage their members to “demonstrate their piety and their desire to
achieve the holy, by engaging in practices that go well beyond any set of
obligatory rules.”69 The kinds of filters employed in the cases discussed in
this part do not attend to questions such as what if the practices in question
are not endorsed by the elites, authorities or majority but only by a minority
of the religious group of which applicants claim to be part? Or, what if
there is internal disagreement over whether certain acts are required or
essential to religious practice? So, one of the dangers of this approach is
that it may lead to the rejection of claims that fall outside the mainstream of
a religion.70 At a deeper level, the objective filters used by the Court to
narrowly construct the notion of “manifestation” of religion seem to fit
with an understanding of religion as “a set of theological propositions”
rather than as “a particular way of living.”71
In sum, the filtering mechanisms that the Court (and the Commission)
employs in the cases outlined above are normatively dense. They tend to
favor those who conform to what is authoritatively prescribed while disempowering those who may disagree, those who may engage in practices prescribed by only a minority within the group or those who may engage in
practices authoritatively encouraged (or accepted). These kinds of filter
appear to miss one crucial insight from religious studies: the fluidity of

68. See, e.g., EVANS, supra note 16, at 122. Moreover, the Court’s approach in cases such as the
ones discussed in this part has been criticized for not being truly objective: the Court does not really
look for evidence from religious leaders or communities but uses its own subjective judgment instead
when determining the requirements of a religion. See id. at 203.
69. David M. Brown, Neutrality or Privilege? A Comment on Religious Freedom, 29 SUPREME
COURT OF CANADA L. REV. 222, 226 (2005).
70. EVANS, supra note 16, at 123.
71. Evans, supra note 12, at 395.
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religion and the dynamic character of religious traditions. As Benjamin
Berger notes:
Perhaps the only safely generalizable statement within religious studies
is that religious traditions are in a constant state of change and adaptation
in response to their surrounding social conditions. Religions are constantly in flux, redefining their practices and beliefs in dialogue with
their local, historical, and social milieus.72

Avoiding positing orthodox dogma as the sole standard of the inquiry73 does not necessarily mean a rejection of institutional or textual
forms of inquiry in the analysis. In fact, attention to lived forms of religion
does not have to involve an either-or approach. According to religious
scholar Robert Orsi, the study of lived religion “directs attention to institutions and persons, texts and rituals, practice and theology, things and ideas.”74
Objective elements, as argued in the previous part, are inevitable and
substantially contribute to the assessment of religious freedom claims.
What is crucial, though, is that in the process, courts remain aware that
interpretations within religious groups are “multiple, contested, and conflicting”75 and avoid tests that encourage what Berger terms “religious
fundamentalism,” that is to say, “a rigid or absolutist fidelity to a particular
interpretation of a tradition.”76
2. Essentializing Religious Groups
In recent years, the Court appears to have gradually moved away from
approaches that explicitly or implicitly require conformity with orthodox
doctrine when determining the scope of freedom of religion. Yet, at times,
the Court’s essentialist views of certain religious groups based on what
Lori Beaman calls “the assumption of orthodoxy”77 still risks hindering
intragroup diversity. Beaman notes:

72. Berger, supra note 1, at 27.
73. As Berger also notes, making orthodox interpretation “the standard for the religious . . . would
be to undergird existing authorities within a community by lending them the definitional support of the
state.” Id.
74. Orsi, supra note 52, at 172. See also Linda Woodhead, Five Concepts of Religion, 21(1)
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY - REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE 121, 133 (2011)
(arguing that lived religion “is less interested in formal theologies and religious structures per se than in
their relations with religious practices in ‘everyday’ life, which includes domestic, familial and leisure
settings, as well as designated religious settings.”).
75. Beaman, supra note 24, at 212. See also Lefebvre, supra note 16, at 47 (warning against
“reducing the [doctrine] inquiry to the most official dogma of the religious group in question”).
76. Berger, supra note 1, at 26.
77. Beaman, supra note 15, at 19.
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There is a tendency when dealing with religious groups with which we
are not familiar to essentialize them, often in orthodox ways. Thus, not
all Muslims require prayer space, not all Sikhs wear kirpan, and so on.
Religious groups and individuals themselves complain that such essentialization is pushing them toward an orthodoxy of practice that is inappropriate.78

Assumptions of this sort make the filters employed by the Court to determine what “counts” as a “manifestation” of religion relatively dense
because they posit certain religious practice as the group paradigmatic
practice and fix it as the “essence” of a certain group identity. These essentialist assumptions are problematic because they tend to use certain practices as the yardstick against which group membership is judged and to deny
legal protection to those who do not conform to the standard.
The Court has employed this kind of filter most notably in cases involving Sikh applicants. One example is Mann Singh v. France (2008), a
case concerning a Sikh man denied the renewal of his driver’s license for
refusing to take off his turban for the picture.79 In assessing whether Mann
Singh’s wearing of his turban falls within the scope of Article 9 of the
ECHR, the Court says:
According to the applicant, the Sikh faith compels its members to wear
the turban in all circumstances. It is not only considered at the heart of
their religion, but also at the heart of their identity. Therefore, the Court
notes that this is an act motivated or inspired by a religion or belief.80

In the second sentence of this passage, the Court leaves out the applicant and objectivizes his practice by means of a linguistic move known in
discourse analysis as “passivization”—the use of the passive voice instead
of the active voice.81 Indeed, the Court states that the turban (“it”) is considered to be at the heart of the Sikh religion and identity without saying
who actually considers the turban as such.82 The context indicates that it is
Mann Singh, the applicant himself, who views the turban this way.83 How78. Id.
79. Mann Singh v. France (dec.), App. No. 24479/07, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 5 (2008), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-89848 (unpublished Court (Fifth Section)
decision) (author’s translation).
80. Id. at 5 (author’s translation) (emphasis added).
81. See, e.g., Michael Billig, The Language of Critical Discourse Analysis: The Case of Nominalization, 19 DISCOURSE AND SOCIETY 783, 785 (2008). For an analysis of Mann Singh along similar
lines, see Lourdes Peroni, Religion and Culture in the Discourse of the European Court of Human
Rights: The Risks of Essentializing and Stereotyping, INT’L J.L. IN CONTEXT (forthcoming June 2014).
82. The Court engages in passivization by stating “the turban is considered” rather than, say,
“Mann Singh considers the turban” Mann Singh, App. No. 24479/07, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 5. See also
Peroni, supra note 81.
83. A reading of Mann Singh’s application confirms that this characterization comes from the
applicant. Referral to the European Court of Human Rights for Mann Singh 2 (June 11, 2007) (author’s
translation) (on file with author and Chicago-Kent Law Review). See also Peroni, supra note 81.
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ever, with the passive construction in “[the turban] is considered”—that is
to say, with the deletion of Mann Singh as the subject—the Court separates
the turban from its wearer and objectivizes his religious practice by representing it as though it were a “thing” or “entity” rather than a dynamic
practice.84 Moreover, this reification of the applicant’s practice enables the
Court to further situate “the turban” at the “heart” of the Sikh identity, in a
move that fixes it and posits it as the defining group characteristic.85
Two forms of essentialism are at work in this mode of reasoning: (1)
the attribution of certain characteristics to some “static ‘essence,’” in a
move that “naturalizes differences that may be historically variant and socially created” and (2) the treatment of such characteristics “as the defining
ones for everyone in the category.”86 This kind of language (re)affirms
intragroup exclusions and inequalities because it suggests that those who
do not follow the “core” practice of wearing a turban—or do not follow it
strictly—may be regarded as less members than others or, simply, as not
members at all.87 In other cases concerning Sikhs—this time students expelled from French schools for refusing to take off their “keski” (a small
turban) in alleged violation of the principle of laïcité—the Court has further
reinforced the essentialist understanding of Sikh identity by stating that the
Sikh religion imposes on its male adherents wearing the turban “in all circumstances.”88 The cases in point are Ranjit Singh v. France and Jasvir
Singh v. France.89 Mann Singh and the Sikh students may have met the
criterion of group membership implicitly established by the Court but future Sikh applicants not wearing the turban “in all circumstances” will most
likely fail the test and get “stuck” in the dense filter thereby created.
84. On the notion of “objectivation” in critical discourse analysis, see THEO VAN LEEUWEN,
DISCOURSE AND PRACTICE: NEW TOOLS FOR CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 63-66 (2008). Van
Leeuwen explains that social actions may be objectivized in discourse when they are “represented
statically, as though they were entities . . . rather than dynamic processes.” Id. at 63. For a more detailed
analysis of the use of objectivation and its implications in Mann Singh, see Peroni, supra note 81.
85. See also Peroni, supra note 81.
86. Anne Phillips, What’s Wrong with Essentialism?, 20 DISTINKTION: SCANDINAVIAN J. OF SOC.
THEORY 47, 53-54, 57 (2010).
87. See also Peroni, supra note 81.
88. See, e.g., Ranjit Singh v. France, App. No. 27561/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 2 (2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-93702 (unpublished Court (Fifth Section)
decision); Jasvir Singh v. France, App. No. 25463/08, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 6 (2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-93701 (unpublished Court (Fifth Section)
decision) (author’s translation). In fact, an earlier case concerning a Sikh applicant illustrates that, back
then, the Court already understood that the Sikh religion mandates that its male followers wear a turban.
Phull v. France, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 419, 424 (holding, in a case brought by a Sikh asked to take off
his turban during an airport security check, that “the Sikh religion requires its male followers to wear a
turban”) (emphasis added).
89. Ranjit Singh, App. No. 27561/08, Eur. Ct. H.R.; Jasvir Singh, App. No. 25463/08, Eur. Ct.
H.R.
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A partial and tentative explanation for why the Court ends up developing these relatively dense (essentialist) filters in cases such as Mann Sigh
points to a mix of elements. These elements include, most notably, the
applicants’ arguments, the Court’s own assumptions of orthodoxy about
groups with which it is not (sufficiently) familiar, and the lack of dispute in
the case.90 Indeed, the applicants in Mann Singh, Ranjit Singh, and Jasvir
Singh relied on what appears to be mainstream views within their religions
in support of their claims (at least, the mandatory or central character of
their religious practices do not appear to have been contested either at the
domestic level or before the Strasbourg Court). In other words, the validity
of their practices as “manifestations” was not challenged.
The essentialist approach adopted by the Court in these cases was, to
some extent, beneficial to the applicants. Indeed, it was mainly thanks to
this approach that the Court regarded their religious practices as falling
under the protection of Article 9 of the ECHR (the essentialist approach,
however, played no role at later stages of the analysis and the applicants’
interests were ultimately defeated by those of the State). Yet, as mentioned
earlier, this essentialist approach is inherently problematic because it might
exclude from the scope of protection of Article 9 of the ECHR future Sikh
applicants falling short of what the Court views as the “core” of Sikh identity.
In conclusion, what makes the filters examined in the Sikh cases “relatively dense” is the essentialist understanding of a particular religious
group identity, that is, the view of wearing the turban as “definitional, core,
and immutable”91 to the Sikh identity. This kind of filter does not make
space for protecting the practices of those group members who do not stand
close enough to the “core” defining group membership and, as a result,
does not make room for protecting dissenting voices and intragroup diversity. In fixing and naturalizing what in fact is dynamic and fluid, the Court
misses again the kind of insight from religious studies noted by Benjamin
Berger above.92

90. See also Peroni, supra note 81.
91. Berger, supra note 1, at 27 (“If the practice is merely one mutable, though perhaps treasured,
component of a vast constellation of interlocking symbolic expressions of a tradition (as it almost
always is), the claim will simply not fare as well in a rights analysis as if the claimant presents the
practice as definitional, core, and immutable.”).
92. Berger further cautions against “adopting tests in the law that encourage individuals or communities to identify an unchanging ‘core’ in their tradition.” Id. at 28.
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B. Relatively Porous Objective Filters
In this part, I examine two groups of cases. In the first group, applicants rely on what seems to be mainstream views within their religious
communities. In these cases, the Court legally “counts” applicants’ religious practices based on objective elements but does not fall into the sort of
essentialist formulations employed in the Sikh cases discussed in the previous part. In the second group of cases, the mandatory or essential character
of the religious practices applicants seek protection of is called into question in the course of the Strasbourg proceedings. In these cases, the Court
recognizes, to a large degree, the applicants’ religious experiences even
when they may not be religiously prescribed.
1. Circumventing Essentialism
In a number of cases brought before the Strasbourg Court, applicants
engaged in practices that appeared to be widely shared within their groups
(or, at least, no objection was raised in their cases as to the essential or
mandatory character of such practices). In fact, in one of these cases the
religious association in question intervened as a third party in the Strasbourg proceedings in support of the applicant’s claim.93 In these cases, the
Court’s considerable reliance on objective filters comes natural and necessary given that the applicants themselves resort to their group’s views in
support of their religious freedom claims. The Court’s approach in these
cases appears to reflect what Peter Edge calls a “sociological strategy” in
determining the scope of freedom of religion.94 In employing this strategy,
Edge explains, courts give emphasis “to what other co-religionists believe,
and how they may behave.”95
Take for example the Court’s following formulation in Thlimmenos v.
Greece (2000), a case concerning a Jehovah’s Witness denied access to the
profession of accountant due to a past conviction for refusing to serve in
the military for religious reasons:

93. Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 23459/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., at. 23-4 (2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-95386 (unpublished Court (Third Section)
decision). The third-party intervener, the European Association of Jehovah’s Christian Witnesses,
supported a Jehovah’s Witness applicant’s claim to conscientious objection to military service in the
following terms: Jehovah’s Witnesses is a “known Christian denomination which involve[s] devotion to
high moral standards and include[s] a refusal to take up arms against their fellow men.” Id.
94. Peter W. Edge, Determining Religion in English Courts, 1 OXFORD JOURNAL OF LAW AND
RELIGION 402, 416 (2012).
95. Id. According to Edge, this is an emerging strategy employed by English courts given the
distinctions that reliance on institutional or textual sources may create: “a distinction between the
teachings of a religious community and the beliefs and practices of that community.” Id.
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[T]he Court notes that the applicant is a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, a religious group committed to pacifism and that there is nothing
in the file to disprove the applicant’s claim that he refused to wear the
military uniform only because he considered that his religion prevented
him from doing so.96

Consider also the following phrasing in Bayatyan v. Armenia (2011), a
case concerning the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witnesses applicant for draft
evasion: “The applicant in the present case is a member of Jehovah’s Witnesses, a religious group whose beliefs include the conviction that service,
even unarmed, within the military is to be opposed.”97 In the two cases, the
Court legally “counts” applicants’ religious practices by looking at their
group (Jehovah’s Witnesses), which is viewed as committed to pacifism or
believes that military service is to be opposed.
Though the two formulations turn to the applicants’ religious groups’
beliefs, none of them makes conformity with what is religiously mandated
a requirement for freedom of religion claims to fall within the scope of
Article 9 of the ECHR. Perhaps most remarkably, what makes the objective
filters employed in these cases relatively porous is that the Court does not
go as far as essentializing the applicants’ religious group in orthodox ways.
It does not affirm, for example, that opposition to military service is “at the
heart” of Jehovah’s Witnesses’ religious identity. The Bayatyan formulation is particularly more open, as it posits a certain religious conviction
(opposition to military service) not as the group belief but as a group belief
among others (“a religious group whose beliefs include”).98 These kinds of
formulations suggest that the Court can recognize certain practices as a
“manifestation” of religion based largely on their acceptance, recognition

96. Thlimmenos v. Greece, 2000-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 265, 278-79 (emphasis added). In fact, at work
in this part of the Court’s reasoning is a mix of objective (“a religious group committed to pacifism”)
and subjective elements (“because he considered that his religion prevented him from doing so”) (emphases added).
97. Bayatyan v. Armenia, App. No. 23459/03, Eur. Ct. H.R., at. 29 (2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-95386 (unpublished Court (Third Section)
decision) (emphasis added). The Court establishes in these terms that Article 9 ECHR was applicable.
98. Contrast these instances with formulations in other cases concerning Jehovah’s Witnesses
where the Court, by means of sweeping generalizations, seems oblivious to intra-group religious diversity. For instance, in Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, a case concerning the banning of the
community in Russia, the Court stated: “It is a well-known fact that Jehovah’s Witnesses are a religious
group committed to pacifism and that their doctrine prevents individual members from performing
military service, wearing uniform or taking up weapons.” 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 38, available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-99221 (unpublished Court (First Section)
decision). Though the Court does not use essentialist language, it still presents its claim as a “fact” that
is, moreover, “well-known.” The Court does not say by whom and how exactly this fact is actually
“well-known.” My sense is that the sort of formulations present in Jehovah’s Witnesses of Moscow
comes close to the essentialist assumptions examined in Part II.A.2.
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or prescription by applicants’ religious groups or dogma in ways that do
not necessarily brush away internal diversity.
2. Lifting the Requirement to Show that Acts Are Religiously Mandated
Three recent examples in the Court’s freedom of religion case law
may serve to illustrate the employment of relatively porous filters in the
second group of cases discussed in this part. The first example is Jakóbski
v. Poland (2010), a case brought by a Buddhist prisoner complaining that
he was refused meat-free meals; the Court said: “[T]he applicant’s decision
to adhere to a vegetarian diet can be regarded as motivated or inspired by a
religion and was not unreasonable. Consequently, the refusal of the prison
authorities to provide him with a vegetarian diet falls within the scope of
Article 9 of the Convention.”99 Another example is Gatis Kovaƺkovs v.
Latvia (2012), also a case concerning the practice of religion in prison,
where the applicant alleged, inter alia, that he was prevented from adequately performing the rituals of Vaishnavism (the Hare Krishna movement) as a result of the confiscation of his incense sticks.100 Taking into
account the applicant’s complaints to domestic authorities, the response
given to the Prison Administration by the president of the RƯga Chapter of
the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, and the information
given by members of the RƯga Vaishnavist congregation, the Court accepted that burning incense sticks could be regarded as motivated or inspired
by a religion.101The third and most recent example is the well-known case
of Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, decided at the beginning of
2013.102 The case concerned four Christian applicants wishing to manifest
their religion at work, two of them by visibly wearing a cross around their
necks. The Court accepted that these two applicants’ insistence on wearing
a cross visibly was motivated by their desire “to bear witness to [their]
Christian faith.”103

99. Jakóbski v Poland, App. No. 18429/06, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 9, 10 (2010), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-102121 (unpublished Court (Fourth Section) decision).
100. Gatis Kovaƺkovs v Latvia, App. No. 35021/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 4 (2012)
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109099 (unpublished Court (Third Section)
decision).
101. Id. at 13.
102. Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 48420/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., available
at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115881.
103. Id. at 33, 36. In this Article, I limit my analysis of Eweida to the cases of two of the four
applicants, that is to say, to the cases of Ms. Eweida and Ms. Chaplin. These two applicants—a checkin employee at British Airways and a nurse at a State hospital—complained that they were not allowed
to wear a cross at work.
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In one way or another, these recent judgments come to ease one of the
hurdles standing on the way to the recognition of more lived forms of religion and intragroup diversity. This is because these judgments legally
“count” a variety of practices without demanding that applicants show that
such practices are required or mandated by their religions. The Court accepts the applicants’ practices as protected by Article 9 of the ECHR even
when their religiously mandated or prescribed character is actually contested by the parties involved in the cases.
Indeed, one notable commonality is that these three applicants’ views
were challenged in their cases at the Strasbourg level by the Respondent
States (based either on the opinion gathered from religious associations or
on other sources). In Jakóbski, for example, the Polish government argued
that vegetarianism was not “an essential aspect” of the practice of the applicant’s religion, since “the strict Mahayana school to which the applicant
claimed to adhere only encouraged vegetarianism but did not prescribe
it.”104 A similar argument was made by the United Kingdom in Eweida:
“[The] applicants’ desire to wear a visible cross, while it may have been
inspired or motivated by a sincere religious commitment, [is] not a recognized religious practice or requirement of Christianity.”105 In Gatis Kovaƺkovs, in turn, the Latvian government presented information provided by
members of the RƯgaVaishnavist congregation. These members had informed the domestic authorities that the obligation to observe the basic
rituals of Vaishnavism, including the burning of incense sticks, was “conditional”: burning incense sticks is not mandatory if circumstances do not
permit it.106
In the three cases, the Court resolves the seeming tensions in favor of
the applicants, deciding that their acts fall under Article 9 protection.
Though the Court does place significant emphasis on the applicants’ subjective views,107 it still relies on objective elements in its assessment in all
cases, albeit to varying extents and at different stages. In Gatis Kovaƺkovs,
for example, the Court’s reasoning exhibits an intricate mix of approaches.
104. Jakóbski, App. No. 18429/06, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 9.
105. Eweida, App. No. 48420/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., at 21.
106. Gatis Kovaƺkovs, App. No. 35021/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 4.
107. One indication of the Court’s attentiveness to the applicants’ views is that if often speaks of
their “wish”, “decision” or “insistence” to avoid eating meat, worship by burning incense sticks or wear
a cross visibly. Jakóbski, App. No. 18429/06, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 10 (“[T]he applicant’s decision to adhere
to a vegetarian diet can be regarded as motivated or inspired by a religion.”) (emphasis added); Gatis
Kovaƺkovs, App. No. 35021/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 13 (“[T]he applicant’s wish to pray, to meditate, to
read religious literature and to worship by burning incense sticks can be regarded as motivated or
inspired by a religion.”) (emphasis added); Eweida, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., at 33 (“Ms Eweida’s insistence
on wearing a cross visibly at work was motivated by her desire to bear witness to her Christian faith.”)
(emphasis added).
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In the first stage of the analysis, the Court looks at both subjective and
objective elements to count the applicant’s ritual of burning incense sticks
as a “manifestation” of his religion. Indeed, relying on both the views of
the applicant and of the leaders and members of his religious community,
the Court first accepts that the applicant’s ritual amounts to a manifestation
of religion.108 However, in the next stage—when establishing whether the
restriction of the prison authorities on the applicant’s religious freedom was
justified—the Court relies exclusively on the information provided by the
RƯga Vaishnavist congregation and concludes: “[E]xcluding items (such as
incense sticks) which are not essential for manifesting a prisoner’s religion
is a proportionate response” of the prison authorities to the need to protect
the rights of other prisoners.109 The objective element—that is, the RƯga
congregation’s view that burning incense sticks is not mandatory if circumstances do not allow—thus serves to reduce the weight of the applicant’s
interests at this stage of the analysis.110 The applicant ultimately lost the
case.
In Jakóbski, in turn, the Court first “counts” the applicant’s vegetarian
practice as falling within the scope of Article 9 based primarily on the applicant’s views.111 Then, however, the Court brings up the objective dimension to reinforce the weight of his interests when assessing whether the
restriction on his religious freedom was justified: “[a]ccording to the applicant’s religion, he was supposed to have a simple meat-free diet.”112 The
Court makes this statement to indicate that the applicant’s request did not
place an undue burden on the prison administration, which simply had to
leave out meat products from his meals. In this statement, the Court no
longer speaks of “the applicant’s decision” to adhere to a vegetarian diet
108. Gatis Kovaƺkovs, App. No. 35021/05, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 13. The Court reached this conclusion
after clarifying that it was not its task to determine “what principles and beliefs are to be considered
central to the applicant’s religion or to enter into any other sort of interpretation of religious questions.”
Id.
109. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). I agree however with Saïla Ouald Chaib that the Court’s remarks
on the non-essential character of the applicant’s practice could have been avoided altogether. As she
argues “even if the Riga chapter would have stated that the burning of incense sticks is essential and
always obliged for followers of Hare Krishna, . . . the Court would still have accepted that a limitation
imposed on this manifestation of religion can be proportionate, namely in light of the rights of the codetainees not to be disturbed.” Saïla Ouald Chaib, Gatis Kovalkovs v. Latvia: The Strasbourg Court
Keeps the Door to Reasonable Accommodation Open, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS (Mar. 15, 2012),
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/03/15/gatis-kovalkovs-v-latvia-the-strasbroug-court-keeps-thedoor-to-reasonable-accommodation-open/.
110. It appears that the Court ultimately relied on the opinion of the RƯga Vaishnavist congregation
because the applicant did not dispute that information. Gatis Kovaƺkovs, App. No. 35021/05, Eur. Ct.
H.R., at 15. The Court might have not applied this objective element so decisively if the applicant had
explicitly stated his disagreement with the views of his religious group in RƯga.
111. Jakóbski, App. No. 18429/06, Eur. Ct. H.R., at 9, 10.
112. Id. at 11.
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but of a diet he was supposed to follow according to a religion.113 In fact,
unlike in Gatis Kovaƺkovs, Mr. Jakóbski’s religious community fully supported his claim. The Buddhist Mission in Poland had sent a letter to the
prison authorities indicating that “[a]ccording to the rules, a Mahayana
Buddhist should avoid eating meat to cultivate compassion for all living
beings.”114 The applicant won the case because the domestic authorities
failed to strike a fair balance between the interests of the prison administration and those of the applicant, “namely the right to manifest his religion
through observance of the rules of the Buddhist religion.”115 In concluding
this way, it becomes clear that the Court’s analysis did not disregard objective elements: “the rules of the Buddhist religion.”
Finally, in Eweida, the Court counts wearing a cross visibly as a manifestation of the applicant’s religious belief not without drawing her subjectivity back to Christianity: “Ms Eweida’s insistence on wearing a cross
visibly at work was motivated by her desire to bear witness to her Christian
faith.”116 Notably, however, the Court speaks of “her” Christian faith—as
opposed to “the” Christian faith—thereby putting yet more emphasis on the
subjective dimension.117 In fact, Eweida is arguably one of the cases in
which the Court comes closest to a purely subjective approach. In other
words, objective elements are hardly discernible in the Court’s reasoning.
Ms. Eweida wins the case but the other Eweida applicant seeking to wear a
cross visibly at work – Ms. Chaplin – loses. For the Strasbourg Court, the
domestic courts failed to strike a fair balance of the interests at stake in the
case of Ms. Eweida but not in the case of Ms. Chaplin.118
What is particularly relevant about Eweida for present purposes is that
the Court explicitly states that “there is no requirement on the applicant to
establish that he or she acted in fulfillment of a duty mandated by the religion in question.”119 As various legal commentators have noted, this statement allows for a broader protection of “more individualistic

113. Moreover, the Court notes that the Buddhist Mission was not consulted on the issue of the
appropriate diet, implying that such a consultation would have been desirable. Id.
114. Id. at 2. The Buddhist Mission in Poland sent another letter to the Prison Director asking him
to provide the applicant with a meat-free diet. Id. at 3.
115. Id. at 12.
116. Eweida, App. No. 48420/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., at 33. The Court follows a similar line of
reasoning in the case of the other Eweida applicant wishing to wear a cross at work – Ms. Chaplin, a
nurse working at a public hospital. However, the Court does not phrase the applicant’s wearing of her
cross visibly as a manifestation of her “Christian faith” but of “her religious belief.” Id. at 36.
117. I am thankful to Saila Ouald Chaib for this point.
118. Eweida, App. No. 48420/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., at 35.
119. Id. at 30.
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manifestations of religion.”120 The Court, however, does not mean that all
religiously motivated or inspired acts will be protected. It makes clear that
they will be so only if they are “intimately linked to the religion or belief.”121 So, acts that are “only remotely connected to a precept of faith
[will] fall outside the protection of Article 9 § 1.”122 In short, while the
Court might no longer look at whether a particular act is required by an
applicant’s religion, it will still look at whether there is a “sufficiently close
and direct nexus between the act and the underlying belief.”123
To conclude, the three cases discussed above suggest that there is usually an intricate mix of objective and subjective factors at work in the
Court’s overall legal reasoning to the point that at times it is hard to determine the extent to which it is the applicants’ or their religious groups’
views or religious precepts that matter. What is notable, though, is that the
Court does not make adherence to a set of prescribed precepts a requirement for a religious claim to fall within the scope of protection of Article 9
ECHR. The Court “counts” these applicants’ acts as “manifestations” of
their religion, even though it sometimes uses objective elements to diminish the weight of the applicants’ interests in later stages of the analysis. Of
equal significance is that the Court eschews essentialist assumptions of
orthodoxy. Indeed, the Court does not portray wearing a crucifix visibly as
being at the heart of Christianity or vegetarianism at the core of Buddhist
religious practice. This is perhaps because the mandatory or central character of these practices was, in one way or another, challenged in all cases by
the Respondent States. Either way, the fact is that, as a result, the filters
employed by the Court in these cases are porous enough to allow for protection of religious individuals who may dissent from the mainstream
views of their religious community and who may engage in more lived
forms of religion.
CONCLUSION
This Article has critically assessed the European Court of Human
Rights’ attentiveness to intragroup diversity by focusing on the ways in
120. Veit Bader, Katayoun Alidadi & Floris Vermeulen, Religious Diversity and Reasonable
Accommodation in the Workplace in Six European Countries: An Introduction, 13 INT’L J. OF
DISCRIMINATION & L. 54, 71 (2013); see also Tracey Reeves, Eweida v United Kingdom: Employment–
Discrimination–Religion, 18 COV. L.J. 136, 140 (2013) (arguing that “this potentially allows for a much
wider and individualised recognition of what practices are protected as a manifestation of belief under
article 9.”).
121. Eweida, App. No. 48420/10, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R., at 30.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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which the Court employs objective lenses to determine whether a certain
practice legally “counts” for protection under Article 9 of the ECHR. The
objective filters, for the most part inevitable in religious freedom claims
given the collective dimension involved, do not have to be exclusionary as
such. The Court should try, however, to keep these objective filters relatively porous if it is to do fuller justice to applicants’ lived religious experiences and diversity within their groups.
Moving towards relatively porous objective filters requires becoming
more critically aware of the implicit assumptions commonly underlying
some of the filters employed in the Strasbourg freedom of religion case
law. These background assumptions concern “religion” more generally and
religious traditions and groups more specifically.
Thus, in the first place, the process of adopting more relatively porous
objective filters may require revising implicit understandings of religion as
solely or primarily “a set of theological propositions”124 to which religious
practitioners adhere. Carolyn Evans insightfully notes that “[s]ome religions . . . give great emphasis to the beliefs or orthodoxy as the constituting
factor of the religion. Others do not do so or place equal emphasis on acting
and belief.”125 As Lori Beaman argues, day-to-day religion “looks quite
different from religious teachings on paper.”126 Adopting more relatively
porous filters does not mean that the Court should de-emphasize institutional, textual and theological elements in its analysis and emphasize individuals, rituals, practice and things instead.127 What this might mean is that
the Court should try to embrace the terms of these “dichotomies” more
interactively and complexly.
In the second place, the process of adopting more relatively porous
objective filters may involve incorporating the premise that interpretations
of religious doctrine or dogma are always internally diverse and contested.128 In other words, the Strasbourg Court (and courts) should avoid reducing its objective inquiry to “the most official dogma of the religious
group in question” and remain aware instead “of the possible range of interpretations.”129

124.
125.
126.
127.
172.
128.
129.

Evans, supra note 12, at 395.
Id. at 396.
Beaman, supra note 24, at 212.
Here, I echo Robert Orsi’s framing of different forms of religiosity. Orsi, supra note 52, at
Beaman, supra note 24, at 212.
Lefebvre, supra note 16, at 47 (making this point in the Canadian legal context).

